


ADA SAC

Marijuana Initiative Subcommittee



OVERVIEW 2012

Date: February 10, 2012
To: Ad Hoc Committee, SAC State Marijuana Initiative
From: John Czuba, Committee Chair
Re: Minutes of Meeting, Thursday 2/9/2012

The Conference call was called to order at 10:03 AM by John Czuba. In attendance were Bianca Farr, Ladell Flowers, Percy Menzies, and Tom Casey. Absent were Alicia Ozenberger and Jason Henke.

Notes:

1. Statue 631.020 was reviewed as the guiding purpose and function of SAC in relation to the convening of this committee, namely to offer an opinion regarding the marijuana ballot initiative that is presently gathering the required number of signatures needed to be included on the statewide general election ballot of fall 2012.
2. It is the overall feeling that in stating any opinion, it should be scientifically validated with evidence based practices to substantiate any position or recommendation.
3. The driving force for SAC is the Prevention, Use and Abuse of addictive substances. Broadly stated, marijuana contains substances that have been determined to be highly addictive. Any effort to legitimize the product should be guided by known science and not general public opinion.
4. The end result of this meeting is to provide Director Mark Stringer and Dr. Schaeffer with our "opinion" based on what we feel is in the best interest of dealing with addictive substances within our state boundaries.

Information was provided on the actual verbiage of the proposal and a prepared legal brief of what passage might entail for the general public. It appears that the public is embracing some sort of lifting of the ban on medical pot, and that passage of some sort of legislation will happen shortly (next 12-48mo). We should look to highly regulating these products with controls similar to what are presently in place for alcohol and tobacco. Discussion on this matter centered on the fact that is erroneous to equate alcohol/tobacco on the same plain as marijuana regarding its addictive properties.

Opinions were expressed that we must remain on track to communicate the total costs involved with decriminalization to include the cost of incarceration vs. treatment as well as societal cost in the workplace of having a workforce that tests dirty for controlled substances.

While it isn't supposed to be about the money, it is in fact about the MONEY. The legitimization of marijuana leads to a cost / benefit analysis. Can it save the State of Missouri enough money to fix projected shortfalls? This is the wrong discussion for SAC to engage in. We must deal with the problems of treatment and it remains that Marijuana is an addictive substance that adversely affects individuals, families and businesses alike.

Resolved, SAC needs to remain neutral on all political aspects of this movement and speak to the problems of addiction.

- a) All notes will be reviewed for accuracy and content before reporting to the full SAC
- b) Usage escalates with legitimization of a product, adding additional strains on services
- c) Prevention, abuse and addiction remains the focus of the work we do

John A. Czuba

Marijuana: What You Should Know

ACT Missouri

July 2011

In the past, marijuana was sometimes characterized as a "harmless herb." However, the average potency of tested marijuana from Federal seizures has more than doubled since 1998, making today's marijuana a different drug.³

Use

Marijuana can be in the form of dried leaves that are consumed orally, or crushed and rolled into a "joint" and smoked. Marijuana paraphernalia can include alligator clips, "roach" clips, cigarette-rolling papers, surgical tubing, bongos, water pipers, glass pipes, or homemade pipes.

Street names


- Weed
- Pot
- 420
- Reefer
- Grass
- Dope
- Mary Jane
- Aunt Mary
- Sinsemilla
- Chronic
- Gangster
- Ganja
- Herb
- Kif
- Schwag

Behavioral Effects

Marijuana intoxication can cause distorted perceptions, impaired coordination, difficulty thinking and problem solving, and problems with learning and memory. Additionally, these adverse impacts can last for days or weeks after the acute effects of the drug wear off, resulting in constant suboptimal intellectual function levels for chronic users.²

Physical Effects


Studies have shown an association between chronic marijuana use and increase rates of anxiety, depression, suicidal thoughts, and schizophrenia.⁴ Additionally, marijuana smoke contains 50-70 percent more carcinogenic hydrocarbons than tobacco smoke, thus making marijuana smoke damaging to the lungs.⁵ Short-term effects of marijuana use include bloodshot eyes and dry mouth.



Missouri Trends:

The prevalence of marijuana, particularly among youth, is a major concern for Missouri. The average age of first use for marijuana is 13.53 years old. The majority of youth (58.8%) think that the police would likely not catch a person smoking marijuana. Nearly 21% of youth users smoked marijuana on school property in the past 30 days.⁶

Age Distribution for Marijuana Treatment in Missouri - 2010



Source: 2010 Status Report on Missouri's Alcohol and Drug Abuse Problems

In 2008, nearly 5,000 hospital and emergency room admissions in Missouri were marijuana related.¹

For more information, contact your local Regional Support Center.

To locate your Regional Support Center, contact ACT Missouri 866-669-2280 or actmissouri.org

1. Missouri Department of Public Safety
2. Pope HG, Gruber AJ, Hudson JI, Huestis MA, Yurgelun-Todd D. Neuropsychological performance in long-term cannabis users. *Arch Gen Psychiatry* 58(10):909–915, 2001.
3. National Center for Natural Products Research (NCNPR), Research Institute of Pharmaceutical Sciences. *Quarterly Report, Potency Monitoring Project, Report 107, September 16, 2009 thru December 15, 2009*. University, MS: NCNPR, Research Institute of Pharmaceutical Sciences, School of Pharmacy, University of Mississippi (January 12, 2010).
4. Moore TH, Zammit S, Lingford-Hughes A, et al. Cannabis use and risk of psychotic or affective mental health outcomes: A systematic review. *Lancet* 370(9584):319–328, 2007.
5. Hoffman, D.; Brunnemann, K.D.; Gori, G.B.; and Wynder, E.E.L. On the carcinogenicity of marijuana smoke. In: V.C. Runeckles, ed., *Recent Advances in Phytochemistry*. New York: Plenum, 1975.
6. Breejen, Karen M., Susan Depue, Carol J. Evans & Liz Sale. *Missouri Student Survey 2010*. (2010). Missouri Department of Mental Health Division of Alcohol and Drug Abuse.

This entry is our account of a study collected by Drug and Alcohol Findings. Citation here does not imply that the document is particularly relevant to Britain and of particular merit, though it may well be both. Unless indicated otherwise, permission is given to distribute this entry or incorporate passages in other documents as long as the source is acknowledged including the web address <http://findings.org.uk>. The original study was not published by Findings; click on the Title to obtain copies. Free reprints may also be available from the authors – click Request reprint to send or adapt the pre-prepared e-mail message. Links to source documents are in blue. Hover mouse over orange text for explanatory notes. The Summary is intended to convey the findings and views expressed in the study.

CLICK HERE AND ENTER E-MAIL ADDRESS TO BE ALERTED TO NEW STUDIES AND REVIEWS

► **Do drug policies affect cannabis markets? A natural experiment in Switzerland, 2000–10.**

Killias M., Isenring G.L., Gilliéron G. et al.

European Journal of Criminology: 2011, 8(3), p. 171–186.

Request reprint using your default e-mail program or write to Dr Killias at martin.killias@rwi.uzh.ch

Studies of a 'natural experiment' in Switzerland in the 2000s suggested that the effective re-criminalization of cannabis production and distribution did diminish availability and use of the drug. The results contradict other findings suggesting that national policies have little effect on cannabis use.

Summary A 'natural experiment' in Switzerland in the 2000s revealed the impacts of changes in the enforcement of cannabis production and distribution laws. By 2001, in response to public sentiment Switzerland had already relaxed its enforcement of laws against the use and distribution of cannabis. At this time the government prepared reforms to enshrine this in law by officially tolerating the sale, possession and use of small amounts of cannabis (usually below 5g), and the production and sale of larger quantities as long as producers and retailers agreed to act under strict control by police and the Department of Agriculture. Though this change had yet to be implemented, in anticipation over the following years visible and quasi-official structures of production, distribution and sale emerged. Concerned over some of the consequences, in 2003 and again in 2004 the Swiss parliament rejected the proposed changes. Over the following months, police and prosecutors resumed former more repressive policies, especially in respect of production and distribution. As a result, shops and production centers were closed during 2005 and 2006. It was this reversal which offered the opportunity to evaluate the impact of tolerance of legal production and distribution versus lack of tolerance.

Findings

Early in 2004 shortly before most of their shops were closed, a survey of cannabis retailers suggested that competition between shops was quite stiff, particularly in respect of price. Nearly all felt they had to provide excellent products and service to keep their customers. Though many said they had never sold high strength and/or smokable cannabis, this conflicted with the number of prosecutions for selling cannabis whose main active ingredient (THC) was above the legal limit.

In summer 2004 when many cannabis shops were still operating, two young men aged around 18 conducted 'test purchase' operations at 50 shops. Of these, 29 sold cannabis without reservation and 26 did so regardless of the young men's age. Usually, the fake

clients asked for 5g or the quantity available for about 50 Swiss francs. The quantities actually sold generally varied between 3.8g and 6.5g and THC levels between 8% and 28%, averaging 16%. Overall, the study confirmed that minors easily obtained high-strength cannabis. Most samples contained THC close to the average of 16% and prices varied little around 11 Swiss francs per gram. In short, quality and prices were fairly well standardized.

In 2009 when all known cannabis shops had closed, a second 'test purchase' operation was conducted, but this time to test the availability of supplies on the now fully illicit market. Two young men walked through inner-city areas where police said cannabis was most available, looking for potential dealers. Over 15 afternoons they made 29 relevant contacts; during 27 they were able to obtain cannabis. All the sales took place in streets and parks. Usually the fake clients were able to spot a dealer in under 20 minutes. The quantity purchased varied far more than in 2004, ranging from 0.38 to nearly 13 grams. Equally inconsistent were prices, varying greatly between 8 and 200 francs per gram. A typical price was 28 francs. The THC content varied between 4% and 18% and averaged 12%, lower than in 2004. At every transaction, the fake clients asked whether the dealer might be able or willing to supply other substances. Only one said they could.

Compared to 2004, typical prices paid per gram had increased from 11 to 28 francs and the variability in price and quantity was much greater and THC content lower. From the relatively standardized market of 2004, by 2009 the price structure was, from the clients' point of view, relatively obscure and bore little relation to the origin or strength of the product.

The political context

The results of our studies suggest that legal policies can strongly affect production, supply, distribution and sale of cannabis. The switch from a liberal to a more repressive policy meant that large-scale agricultural was partly replaced by small-scale production on private premises, and sales moved back from shops to the streets. Formerly an export country, illegal import of cannabis in to Switzerland resumed, though probably not enough to compensate for lost local production. For users without links to home-based production networks, availability of cannabis may have decreased substantially, probably prompting decreased consumption. However, the market and its price structure became far more variable and obscure. Prices soared, possibly reflecting reduced supply and more marginal and criminal suppliers. Street sales favored cheating because quantities cannot be accurately weighed and suppliers had little interest in repeat sales to unknown customers, feeling little need to gain their trust. On the other hand, and contrary to a widely held view, markets for cannabis and other substances seem to have remained separated.

Surveys in Switzerland and abroad suggest that policies making cannabis more easily available were followed by increasing rates of use, whereas Switzerland's opposite policy after 2004 was associated with a drop in both the prevalence and frequency of cannabis use. Establishing to what extent policy changes caused changes in use is for the moment impossible, but data is consistent with the assumption that policies affect the availability and (indirectly) use of cannabis.

Thanks for their comments on this entry in draft to Martin Killias of the Institute of Criminology at the University of Zurich. Commentators bear no responsibility for the text including the interpretations and any remaining errors.

Last revised 06 October 2011

MEMORANDUM

June 4, 2012

TO: ADA ADVISORY COUNCIL

FROM: THOMAS J. CASEY

MISSOURI CANNABIS INITIATIVE PETITION

BACKGROUND & PROCEDURE

On July 6, 2011, Columbia attorney Dan Viets filed an Initiative petition¹ with the Missouri secretary of state, the object of which is to allow Missouri voters at large to decide whether criminal prohibition of marijuana should be abandoned in favor of a system of marijuana regulation and taxation.²

On November 7, 2011, Missouri Secretary of State Robin Carnahan certified the measure was in sufficient form to proceed with collection of signatures preparatory to submission to voters. In practice, that means that about 150,000 registered voters (constituting at least 8% of the voters in 6 of the nine congressional districts) must sign a petition requesting the proposal be submitted to the electorate at the next general election. The deadline for collection of signatures is May 6. If sufficient signatures are collected, they will be submitted to local election authorities for verification. Once certified by the secretary of state, the proposition will be submitted to voters at the November 6, 2012 general election. The measure will become law if approved by majority vote.

The proposition that would be submitted to voters in November is as follows:

Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to:

- *legalize cannabis (commonly known as marijuana) for individuals 21 years or older;*
- *make medical cannabis available to individuals with a physician's recommendation including those under 21 with parental or legal guardian consent and physician supervision;*
- *create licensing processes for operation of cannabis establishments;*³
- *release individuals incarcerated or on probation or parole for non-violent, cannabis-only offenses which would no longer be illegal and expunge all records related to such offenses; and*
- *allow the legislature to enact a tax on the retail sale of dried cannabis up to \$100 per pound?*

¹ Actually, two identical petitions were filed. One seeks to amend the constitution; the other seeks statutory change. Procedurally, constitutional amendments require more signatures (8%) than statutory amendments (5%) for submission to the electorate. Substantively, constitutional amendments cannot be "undone" by the legislature (e.g. the Hancock Amendment); statutory amendments can (e.g. the "Puppy Mill" initiative).

² The procedure for enacting law by Initiative measure is intricate and defined by constitution, statute, and state regulation. The Secretary of State publishes an excellent compendium of Initiative procedure: "MAKING YOUR VOICE HEARD" which can be found at <http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/pubs/makeyourvoiceheard/myvhintro.asp>

³ Curiously, the proposed amendment (section 5) charges the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services, not the Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control, or the Division of Alcohol and Drug Abuse with regulatory authority. I'm dubious whether this is appropriate.

*Annual state government operating costs would increase by at least \$1 million with the total increase being unknown. Those costs would be offset by an unknown increase in fee and tax revenues. The fiscal impact to local governmental entities is unknown with some increase in revenue possible.*⁴

PREMISES FOR POLICY POSITION

My position on the Marijuana Initiative proceeds from the following premises:

1. MARIJUANA IS BOTH DANGEROUS AND ADDICTIVE

Marijuana is the most commonly abused illicit drug in the United States. Long-term marijuana abuse can lead to addiction. Estimates from research suggest that about 9% of users become addicted to marijuana; this number increases among those who start young (to about 17%) and among daily users (25-50%). The latest treatment data indicate that in 2008 marijuana accounted for 17% of admissions (322,000) to treatment facilities in the United States, second only to opiates among illicit substances.⁵

I have no doubt marijuana is a dangerous and addictive substance, on the order of alcohol and nicotine, but perhaps not on the plane of cocaine or heroin.⁶ (This is an important distinction which serves to bolster the credibility of the "NOT EVEN ONCE" campaign against heroin.)

2. MARIJUANA PROHIBITION HAS FAILED

The stated objective of the "War on Drugs" declared by President Nixon in 1972 was to eliminate drugs (including marijuana) from American society. That has not happened.

*"The global war on drugs has failed. When the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs came into being 50 years ago, and when President Nixon launched the US government's war on drugs 40 years ago, policymakers believed that harsh law enforcement action against those involved in drug production, distribution and use would lead to an ever-diminishing market in controlled drugs such as heroin, cocaine and cannabis, and the eventual achievement of a 'drug free world'. In practice, the global scale of illegal drug markets – largely controlled by organized crime – has grown dramatically over this period."*⁷

Marijuana is widely available in part as a result of rising production in both Mexico and the United States. Marijuana production in Mexico has increased an estimated 59% since 2003, while cannabis eradication in Mexico has decreased. This has resulted in significantly more marijuana entering the United States.⁸ Meanwhile, well-organized criminal groups have cultivated large quantities of

⁴ Note that the submission to the voters is merely a summary of the law, prepared by the Secretary of State with input from the attorney general and state auditor. The measure in its entirety can be viewed at <http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/2012petitions/2012-082.asp>

⁵ <http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/infocfacts/marijuana>

⁶ The Lancet, Volume 376, Issue 9752, Pages 1558 - 1565, 6 November 2010.

⁷ "War on Drugs", *Global Commission on Drug Policy*, June 2011

⁸ "Drug Availability in the United States", U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment, February 2010.

marijuana within the United States. The amount of marijuana produced in the United States appears to be very high despite continual increases in the number of plants eradicated.⁹

I believe we began the war on drugs with the best of intentions. America felt good; still feels good today; still believes today that by enacting more stringent laws, imposing enhanced punishment, building more prisons, putting more DEA agents on the street, putting more sophisticated surveillance equipment on our borders, that the drug problem can be solved. We spent billions of dollars each year for 40 years. I begrudge none of that spending had it successfully removed drugs from society. Unfortunately, it has not.

Marijuana is more easily accessible, cheaper, more potent, more frequently used, and used by more individuals today than in 1972 when America declared war on drugs. A recent survey reported that, for the first time, more high school seniors smoke marijuana than cigarettes.¹⁰ In 2009, 16.7 million Americans aged 12 or older used marijuana at least once in the last month.¹¹ History has demonstrated, as it did with alcohol in the 1920s, that prohibition of a product fails so long as insatiable demand for the product continues. Prohibition only drives the supply underground into the untaxed, unregulated netherworld of organized crime.

3. MARIJUANA ABUSE PREVENTION, AND ADDICTION TREATMENT, PROGRAMS WORK

Demand focused abuse prevention and addiction treatment programs succeed where supply focused prohibition fails. It is fundamental to the work of the Missouri Division of Alcohol and Drug Abuse which is charged by statute with providing substance abuse prevention and treatment programming throughout the state. Such programs have become the focus, if not the *raison d'être*, of organizations such as NCADA. Drug court programs are one example of treatment programs that work and which merit expansion.

Unfortunately, Missouri allocates scant resources to treatment and prevention programs compared to the resources devoted to marijuana prohibition enforcement. The total cost of substance abuse on Missouri government is approximately \$1.3 billion annually. The total cost of substance abuse to Missouri society is approximately \$7 billion. Missouri budgets \$96.3 million for the statewide substance abuse prevention and treatment system. It costs the State of Missouri \$1,346 for each addict it treats.¹²

We have barely scratched the surface of what *can* be done by way of prevention and treatment of marijuana abuse and addiction. The conundrum is how to marshal sufficient resources to marijuana prevention and treatment so as to make a meaningful difference in demand for the substance. Three realistic solutions exist:

1. Divert resources currently allocated to enforcement of marijuana prohibition;
2. Substitute a scheme of regulation and taxation for the current scheme of prohibition;
3. Do both.

⁹ "Drug Availability in the United States", U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment, February 2010.

¹⁰ "Monitoring the Future: National Results on Adolescent Drug Use", 2011; Lloyd D. Johnston, Ph.D.; Patrick M. O'Malley, Ph.D.; Jerald G. Bachman, Ph.D.; John E. Schulenberg, Ph.D.; The University of Michigan Institute for Social Research; Sponsored by: The National Institute on Drug Abuse; National Institutes of Health

¹¹ National Institute on Drug Abuse; InfoFacts; November 2010; www.drugabuse.gov/publications/infofacts/marijuana;

¹² "The Burden of Substance Abuse on the State of Missouri", Prepared by the Missouri Department of Mental Health, Division of Alcohol and Drug Abuse, November 2008.

A 2005 study by Harvard visiting professor Jeffrey Miron addressed the economic implications of legalizing marijuana.¹³ He estimated that marijuana legalization would generate tax revenue of \$6.2 billion annually if taxed at rates comparable to those on alcohol and tobacco. That is revenue in addition to government savings of perhaps \$7 billion per year on marijuana criminal enforcement. Miron's study, although funded by a pro-legalization group, was endorsed by 530 economists (including 10 from Missouri universities). Milton Friedman and two other Nobel laureates were among those who signed.

A 2010 study by marijuana policy researcher Jon Gettman compared the cash value of marijuana production in the U.S. with other crops.¹⁴ He estimated that marijuana production, at a value of \$35.8 billion, exceeded the combined value of corn (\$23.3 billion) and wheat (\$7.5 billion). He cited marijuana as the top cash crop in 12 states and among the top three cash crops in 30. Gettman concluded that despite massive eradication efforts at the hands of the federal government, "marijuana has become a pervasive and ineradicable part of the national economy".

4. MARIJUANA REGULATION AND TAXATION WILL EVENTUALLY REPLACE THE CURRENT PROHIBITION

It may not happen this year. It may not happen with this particular proposal. It may not happen first in Missouri. But it is going to happen.

Public sentiment toward legalization has shifted dramatically and swiftly.¹⁵ Gallup polling has tracked the issue for 40 years. Gallup asks the question, "Do you think the use of marijuana should be made legal or not?" In 1970, 16% said yes. In 2011, 54% said yes. Astonishingly, there was a 12% change in "yes" responses from 2010 to 2011, from 42% to 54%.¹⁶

I predict that the course of cannabis legalization will parallel the course taken a generation ago when many states legalized casino or "riverboat" gambling. The first state to rationally decriminalize, but strictly regulate and rigorously tax, marijuana (probably not Missouri) will realize enormous tax revenue from the exercise. When the scope of revenue generated by the sale of cannabis is demonstrated, other states will follow like lemmings.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE MARIJUANA INITIATIVE

My thinking on marijuana policy conjures an image of Jean Seberg in the 1969 box office flop "Paint Your Wagon". As the disgruntled second wife of a Mormon polygamist, she volunteers to be auctioned to the highest bidder in a California gold mining camp. Her husband exclaims, "But Elizabeth, you don't know what you'd be getting." To which she brazenly replies, "No, but I know what I've had."

I submit that it's time to start thinking outside the box. We continue to throw good money after bad chasing the pipe dream (excuse the pun) that prohibition will succeed. If we seriously believe that marijuana abuse can be prevented and marijuana addiction can be successfully treated, then shouldn't we at least *consider* a different approach that *could* generate more funding for our programs? These are

¹³ "The Budgetary Implications of Marijuana Prohibition"; June 2005; Jeffrey A. Miron; Visiting Professor of Economics; Department of Economics; Harvard University

¹⁴ "Marijuana Production in the United States"; Jon Gettman, Ph.D.; Bulletin of Marijuana Reform; 2006.

¹⁵ The Miami Herald, February 17, 2012, "Pro-drug legalization forces are gaining clout" by Andres Oppenheimer

¹⁶ www.gallup.com, October 17, 2011

uncharted waters. No one knows what we'll get if legalization prevails, but we certainly know what we've had. Anyone, on either side of the issue, who claims to see beyond the horizon is a false prophet.

PRIOR TO BALLOT CERTIFICATION

- Make no formal statement until and unless the Secretary of State certifies the issue will appear on the November General Election ballot.
- Formulate policy now for immediate release if certification occurs.

CONCERNING THE ULTIMATE ISSUE

- The issue of legalization falls within the sovereignty of the people in a democratic society. ADA should remain neutral¹⁷ on the ultimate issue of legalization but strive to provide objective data to allow the public to make an informed decision.
- Marijuana is a dangerous and addictive substance. The fact that its legalization is under debate does not imply it is a "safe" substance.
- Scrupulously avoid speculation concerning the outcome of legalization. The law of unforeseen consequences will rule. Some consequences may be savory; some may just reek.

CONTINGENCY POLICY IF LEGALIZATION PREVAILS

- Legalization should be accompanied by strict regulation and rigorous taxation.
- Revenue from taxation should be earmarked for prevention and treatment programs (while avoiding the pitfalls encountered by the earmarking of casino revenue for educational purposes).
- Minors must be adequately insulated from access to marijuana. Criminal penalties for sale or distribution to a minor.
- Criminal penalties for driving while intoxicated; establish method of measurement; establish definition of "intoxication".
- Limitation of amount sold; for personal use only; not for resale;
- Conspicuous risk warnings on product labels; certification of purity and potency.
- Maximum restriction of advertising, marketing, and promotion; no TV, internet, billboards, buses, radio, newspapers.
- Prohibition of use in public places; no restaurants, sporting events, no public intoxication.

DEAL BREAKING *SINE QUA NON* OF NEUTRALITY


Neutrality on the ultimate issue should be conditioned upon the feasibility of adequate regulation. The language of the proposed amendment should be immediately scoured to determine whether sufficient regulatory authority is provided. This is a deal breaker from my perspective. If the language of the measure precludes regulation sufficient to accomplish the regulatory goals set forth above, then we should oppose the ultimate issue. This warrants immediate collaboration among counsel for the organizations which would actually draft such regulations (presumably, the Department of Health, the Attorney General, the Division of Alcohol and Drug Abuse, the Department of Revenue, and the Department of Public Safety).

¹⁷ But see "Deal Breaking", below

Deal With Drug Use: Support the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA)

- ❖ NIDA research has found that addiction is a complex disease that starts early, and that prevention and early intervention work best to curtail it.
- ❖ The best way to reduce the huge toll that drug abuse and addiction exact from individuals, families and communities is to prevent the damage before it occurs. Research has clearly demonstrated that universal, broad-based prevention approaches involving individuals, their families, schools and communities can reduce drug use.
- ❖ NIDA research has revealed much about the biological and social variables that foster or protect against drug abuse and addiction. By enhancing our understanding of the neurobiological factors that motivate behaviors related to abuse and addiction, we can more effectively prevent them.
- ❖ Without further support, NIDA research aimed at helping people of all ages to prevent becoming addicted and to recover quickly when they do will be stifled. This is a critical public health issue.

After Marijuana, Nonmedical use of Prescription and Over-the-Counter Medications Account for Most of the Commonly Abused Drugs in 12th-Graders (*in the past year*)




Categories are not mutually exclusive

SOURCE: University of Michigan, 2011 Monitoring the Future Study


When Students Perceive a Drug as Harmful Abuse Rates Decrease

12th Graders' Past Year Marijuana Use vs. Perceived Risk of Occasional Marijuana Use



SOURCE: University of Michigan, 2011 Monitoring the Future Study

Recent Trends Show Marijuana Use Increasing



- ❖ Declines in marijuana use in the late 1990s and early 2000s have been erased -- past-year use among 12th graders in 2011 is not significantly different from its recent peak in 1997.
- ❖ Daily use is also a serious concern. 2011 saw the **highest levels of daily marijuana use** among 12th graders (6.6%) in the past 30 years.
- ❖ Attitudes towards substance abuse, often seen as harbingers of change, could explain these findings. Among all three grades, recent trends show a **decline in perceived risk of harm associated with marijuana use**.

SOURCE: University of Michigan, 2011 Monitoring the Future Study